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ABSTRACT
Venezuela’s relations with Iran date back into the sixties when both were founding members of the OPEC. Iran’s influence in Latin America has become quite large since the Iranian revolution. Iran sees Latin America as a strategic priority for its global positioning.
The Lebanese immigration towards South America has begun a while ago. But there’s
a period, during the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990) when a large number of Lebanese
immigrants came to the continent. Back then, according to some experts, Hezbollah and
Iran took advantage of this mass migration and infiltrated their agents and recruiters
among the Muslim migrants. Hezbollah is probably the most organized terrorist organization in the World in respect to its illegal financing activities. The group funds its regular operations through all sorts of crimes. Hezbollah has a tight relationship with Iran.
Ever since Iran has established its covert operations in Venezuela, Hezbollah has come
along, as its proxy. Venezuela is submerged in crime and corruption. The Venezuelan government has been infiltrated by transnational organized crime for more than a decade.
The convergence of corruption, crime, violence and terrorism in Venezuela was enabled
by a set of conditions and circumstances that basically got entrenched after Chávez was
inaugurated as president in 1999. From that time onwards, Venezuela became a source
of political, financial and logistical support for Hezbollah within Latin America. Their
relationship impacts the neighboring countries, particularly Brazil.
Keywords: Venezuela. Hezbollah. Iran. Violence. Crime. Corruption. Terrorism.
Organized Crime. Convergence. Brazil.

Revista Brasileira de Ciências Policiais
Recebido em 23 de outubro de 2017.
Aceito em 11 de setembro de 2018.

Brasília, v. 9, n. 1, p. 43-90, jan/jun 2018.

ISSN 2178-0013
ISSN Eletrônico 2318-6917

43

Venezuela´s Toxic Relations with Iran and Hezbollah

1. Introduction
In 2007, the current president of Venezuela, Nicolás Maduro,
was still fairly unknown to the general public when he met the leader
of Hezbollah1, Hassan Nasrallah2, in a hotel in Damascus/Syria. At the
meeting was also present Rafael Isea, Venezuela’s former vice-minister
of Finance and a fourth person, a translator. (BLASCO, 2015). They
apparently had a long talk. What exactly happened in that room and
the conversation’s details remain undisclosed, but it was later reported
that the talk was about the arrangements between Hezbollah and the
Venezuelan government in a way that Hezbollah would have a stronger
grip within Venezuela so it could better structure its Colombian cocaine
trafficking operations from Venezuela, as well as the trafficking of
arms to Lebanon, and also Hezbollah’s access to Venezuelan passports
in order to ease the travels of its operatives in and out of the country.
(BLASCO, 2015; NAGEL, 2015; HUMIRE, 2015; CHAYA, 2017).
The next day, Isea and Maduro would take a private flight to Tehran to
join Hugo Chávez and meet Iran’s president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad3
for furthering their diplomatic mission in the region. (BLASCO, 2015;
NAGEL, 2015).
That inauspicious encounter in Damascus and the strategic
meeting in Tehran were simply the consolidation of a relationship
between Hezbollah/Iran and Venezuelan government that lasts to
this day. That relationship has enabled an avenue of crime, corruption,
violence and terrorism that troubles the country and not only threatens
its political viability but also the stability of its neighbors.
The first objective of this article is to address the
interconnections of the above-mentioned relationship with its
1 Hezbollah is a Lebanon-based Shiite Islamic political entity that was founded in 1982 following the
Israeli’s invasion of south Lebanon. Its rise is also connected to two other local and regional factors:
the oppression of Shia population in Lebanon and the Iranian Revolution (Hezbollah was inspired
by Iran’s revolution and the teachings of Ayatollah Khomeini). Hezbollah considers itself a group
aimed at opposing the Western influence in the Middle East as well as resisting against the Israeli state.
(CAMETT, 2011; REALUYO, 2014; JOHNSON, 2014). See also footnote 4.
2 Hassan Nasrallah has been the leader of Hezbollah since 1992.
3 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was the president of Iran from 2005 through 2013. He and Hugo Chávez
became very close. Their intimate relationship spurred the ties between Venezuela and Iran to a level
never seen before between a Latin America country and Iran. (FARAH, 2011; CONSTANZA, 2012).
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criminal/terrorist by-products. Secondly, the essay seeks to identify
the most pressing implications/consequences for Venezuela and
Brazil derived from the criminal enterprises conducted by the triad
Venezuela-Iran-Hezbollah within the continent. In the conclusion,
I indicate the most pressing threats for the region, primarily for the
countries that border Venezuela, particularly Brazil.
Hezbollah4 is probably the most organized terrorist
organization in the World in respect to its illegal financing
activities. (FARAH, 2011; REALUYO, 2014). Back in 2010, the
US administration has described Hezbollah as the most technically
skilled and proficient terrorist group in the world. (CFR, 2014).
The group funds its regular operations through all sorts of criminal
activities such as drugs and arms trafficking, diamonds and precious
stones smuggling, counterfeit goods trading, among other criminal
enterprises. Hezbollah relies on an extensive web of global facilitators
in different continents to make its criminal activities feasible. (FARAH,
2011; CAMETT, 2011; REALUYO, 2014, LEVITT, 2016b).
In the past, the bulk of its financing was state sponsored, by both
Iran and Syria. In its beginning, Hezbollah was trained and equipped
by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, from which it also received its funding.
Ever since the group came into existence, it has had close ties with Iran
and also Syria5. Hezbollah relies mainly in three sources of funding6:
4 The European Union-EU considers Hezbollah military wing a terrorist organization since 2013. (EU,
2017). The United Kingdom also considers Hezbollah’s military wing a terrorist organization. (CEP,
2017). The United States of America – USA considers Hezbollah’s both Political and Military wing
to be a terrorist organization since 1997. (FTO, 2017). The following countries also consider both
Hezbollah’s wings to be terrorist organizations: Israel, Canada, The Netherlands, France, Germany,
Australia, New Zealand, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates.
Recently, in 2016, the Arab League also designated Hezbollah a terrorist group, but the following
countries have protested or rejected the League’s designation: Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Algeria
and Tunisia. (CEP, 2017).
5 Hezbollah, Iran and Syria have a historical alliance. Iran provides continuous material support, as well
as training, logistics and financing to its regional partners, including Syria and Hezbollah. In 2006,
Iran and Syria armed Hezbollah in its war against Israel. The Assad regime in Syria plays a vital role for
Hezbollah. It often serves as a corridor for Iranian material assistance and also a training ground for
Hezbollah’s operatives. Hezbollah also sees Syria as its rearguard in its conflict with Israel. Nowadays,
the Assad regime has relied constantly on its allies Iran and Hezbollah for support. (SULLIVAN,
2014).
6 There is another source of funding for Hezbollah, which is the tax-like collection that the group levies
on local businesses in the areas it controls, notably in the Beqaa Valley and the Southern portion of
Lebanon. (RUDNER, 2010). Nonetheless, this does not appear to be a core source of funding for the
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Iran, private donations7 and criminal enterprises. (RUDNER, 2010;
ASAL et al. 2012; CONSTANZA, 2012; LEUPRECHT et al.
2015). Hezbollah has for a long time been favored by Iranian largesse.
Iran is a notorious sponsor of Hezbollah. Although Iran has been a
regular and reliable source of funding since the group emerged, its
financing towards Hezbollah has fluctuated throughout the years.
The administrations of both president Rafsanjani (1989-1997)
and president Khatami (1997-2005) allegedly slashed funding for
Hezbollah by nearly 70%. (HAMZEH, 2004; ARENA, 2006). Over
the years, as the geopolitical scenario was subjected to changes, Iran
became debilitated by the impact of several international sanctions8,
drop in the price of oil, and other considerations; thus, its funding
towards Hezbollah has apparently further diminished9. (FARAH,
2011; NEUMANN, 2011; CAMETT, 2011; REALUYO, 2014;
LEVITT, 2016b).
The Lebanese migration to South America has begun a while
ago. But there’s a specific period that’s worth considering; i.e. the
Lebanese civil war (1975-1990) when a large number of Lebanese
immigrants flocked to South America. (NEUMANN, 2011; LEVITT,
2015). Back then, according to some experts, Hezbollah and Iran
group.
7 Hezbollah also generates income through the solicitation of private donations and the deviation of
revenue from business, charities and religious circles built up to serve as “fronts” to covertly collect
and transfer money to bank accounts under its control. (CONSTANZA, 2012).
8 Iran has been sanctioned for more than three decades by the US. The first US sanctions were intended
to make Iran stop supporting acts of terrorism and to limit Iran’s strategic power in the Middle East.
Eventually, since mid 2000, US sanctions were aimed at ensuring that Iran’s nuclear program was
intended for civilian purposes only. From 2010, onwards the international community joint forces
with the US, through the UN – United Nations, and also began sanctioning Iran’s nuclear program.
However, in January 2016, the IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency has confirmed that
Iran had complied with the stipulated nuclear dismantlement commitments. Afterwards, most of
US and UN sanctions were lifted. Nonetheless, UN Security Council resolution 2231 still restricts
Iran’s conventional arms programs for a further five years, plus a restriction on Iran’s missile program
for eight more years. Entities particularly linked to Iran’s ballistic missile program, like the IRGC –
Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps and its Quds Force are still under sanctions. (IRANWATCH,
2018; KATZMAN, 2018). In spite of that, the US has recently reimposed sanctions on Iran that it
lifted two years ago. The US has withdrawn from the multilateral deal on May 8th, 2018. Two sets
of sanctions are reinstated and they restrict: Iran’s purchase of US currency, the trade in gold and
precious metals, the sale to Iran of auto parts, commercial aircraft and its parts, the purchase of oil and
petrochemicals from Iran. However, the European countries signatories of the multilateral deal are
reported to be drawing up a package of economic measures to try to save the deal. (CFR, 2018).
9 Despite the fact that Iranian funding for Hezbollah has certainly decreased; some authors say that
Iran’s financing is still the group’s main source of income. (BROWN, 2013; SULLIVAN; BEITEL,
2016; AEI, 2017).
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took advantage of this mass migration and infiltrated their agents and
recruiters among the Muslim migrants on the continent10. Years later,
in the early nineties, their efforts in setting up terrorist cells in South
America became a reality and they were able to carry a few very deadly
terrorist attacks in Argentina. (NISMAN, 2006; HUDSON, 2010;
NEUMANN, 2011; CONSTANZA, 2012; LEVITT, 2015).
The earliest and strongest foothold of Hezbollah’s network within
South America lies in a region known as “Tri-Border Area” - TBA, which is
a land border shared by Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina. Hezbollah decided
to structure its criminal activities in this area because of TBA’s shameful
reputation for lawlessness, as well as the presence of an already large Muslim
community. This corner of the continent emerged as an unruly region
by mid seventies when Paraguay created a free trade zone in the town of
Ciudad del Este. This town became a mecca for cheap electronic goods, a
market that attracted hundreds of thousands of Brazilian and Argentinian
customers. (HUDSON, 2010; CONSTANZA, 2012; REALUYO,
2014; KESHAWARZ, 2015; JIANG, 2015; LASMAR, 2015). Soon,
the Lebanese diaspora took advantage of it and established a myriad of
small shops dedicated to selling electronic goods, both genuine goods and
also counterfeited ones. Hezbollah operatives and sympathizers followed
suit, and quickly engaged in drugs and arms trafficking, counterfeiting
and money laundering to fund their endeavors in Lebanon. (NISMAN,
2006; HUDSON, 2010; CONSTANZA, 2012; REALUYO, 2014;
KESHAWARZ, 2015; JIANG, 2015; LEVITT, 2016a; SULLIVAN;
BEITEL, 2016; AEI, 2017).
Nevertheless, the TBA is not the only place within South
America with a large Muslim population and Hezbollah’s presence. In
the northern portion of the continent, there are two particular areas
with similar characteristics; the Colombian town of Maicao, located
in La Guajira province, which lies in the border between Colombia
and Venezuela and Isla Margarita/Venezuela, just north of Caracas. In
Maicao, where there is a prominent Muslim community, Hezbollah has
10 The amount of Muslims living in the Tri-Border Area is estimated to be around 20.000 to 30.000.
(HUDSON, 2010; JIANG, 2015). They live mainly in Ciudad del Este/Paraguay and Foz do Iguaçu/
Brazil. Most of them live in Foz do Iguaçu. An estimate of 90% of them are of Lebanese descent, the
others are of Palestinian and Syrian descent, mostly. (HUDSON, 2010). The majority of the Muslims
are Shia. (TREVISI, 2013).
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a fairly strong presence and its operatives and sympathizers move freely11.
(ICT, 2008; PICKELL, 2010; NEUMANN, 2011; CONSTANZA,
2012; FARAH, 2015; LEVITT, 2016b). Not very far from there,
Isla Margarita is another region with a large Muslim population.
Some scholars say that the TBA was surpassed by Isla Margarita as
Hezbollah’s center of operations and safe haven within Latin America12.
(NORIEGA, 2011; NORIEGA; CÁRDENAS, 2011).
Iran’s influence in the Western Hemisphere, particularly
in Latin America has become gradually more significant since the
Iranian Revolution13. Iran sees Latin America as a strategic priority
for its global positioning14. ( JOHNSON, 2014; HUMIRE, 2015;
BRANDON; GRAY, 2015). Broadly speaking, Iran’s strategy to
insert itself in Latin America has four layers, as some experts say.
(HUMIRE, 2015). It begins with cultural exchange upon a specific
country, which later evolves into a formal diplomatic relation that
enables economic cooperation. Then it comes the fourth layer, which
is the one that works in the underground. Once the diplomatic mission
is functional and the bilateral economic cooperation has begun, Iran
is able to secure the necessary cover to send in its operatives, create
front companies and establish backdoor channels with the host
government15. (HUMIRE, 2015). Iran’s covert insertion in South
11 In Maicao, there is an Arab community of around 8.000 people; mostly Arab traders that supposedly
pay Hezbollah taxation on revenue. This taxation derives both from extortion and spontaneous
support. These payments are made through Venezuelan and Panamanian banking systems. (ICT,
2008; PICKELL, 2010).
12 Isla Margarita is a free trade zone that lies northeast of Caracas, and is home for a large community of
Arabs, mainly Lebanese and Iranian. There is a Venezuelan-Arab Friendship Association that apparently
supports Hamas and Hezbollah cells, which are active on the island generating funds for their groups
through drug and arms trafficking, money laundering and the like. (ROBINSON, 2003).
13 I will not deepen into the details of Iran’s geopolitical objectives in the Western Hemisphere because
this is not the purpose of this article.
14 Despite of the fact that the current Iranian president Hassan Rouhani has lessen the Iranian focus
on Latin America, Iran has been considerably interested in the continent for a few reasons, among
them, but not limited to: up to the year 2016 Iran had sought to circumvent UN/USA sanctions (In
Latin America the sanctions were apparently not well enforced), nations like Venezuela, Nicaragua,
Cuba, Ecuador and Bolivia serve as political allies against the UN and the USA (specially because
their leftist governments share a common antagonism towards the USA). ( JOHNSON, 2014;
HUMIRE, 2015; BRANDON; GRAY, 2015). Once present in Latin American nations, Iran is
able to execute its covert actions and spread its theocratic ideology especially among the local Shia
Muslims. ( JOHNSON, 2014; HUMIRE, 2015; BRANDON; GRAY, 2015).
15 Some authors claim that the Islamic Republic’s agents seek to reach notable individuals within
the countries’ Muslim population and local leadership. So they become able to capitalize on their
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America is facilitated because of the rampant corruption throughout
the continent and the predominance of weak institutions within its
countries. Some authors claim that Iran has currently been successful
in moving through nearly every layer of most ALBA16 countries17.
(HUMIRE, 2015).

2. Venezuela´s Controversial Alliance with
Iran
Venezuela’s relations with Iran are longstanding and date back
into the sixties when both were founding members of the OPEC. In
the aftermath of the Iranian revolution, in 1979, Iran moved towards
approaching Latin American countries in an effort to increase its trade
with the region18. Venezuela was one of the first countries in which
Iran established some sort of trading agreement. ( JOHNSON, 2014;
SULLIVAN; BEITEL, 2016).
Later, in 2001 and 2003 president Chávez visited Iran and
signed a deal which prompted a joint venture to produce tractors
in Venezuela. Soon there was also an opening of a car assembly
plant to manufacture Iranian cars in the country19 (FARHI, 2009;
political connections and wealth. (BERMAN; HUMIRE, 2014; HUMIRE, 2015). Therefore, Iran
supposedly boosts the capability of its intelligence operatives to blend in with the local societies.
After that, it apparently does not take long to its agents to infiltrate local institutions, penetrate
government agencies, co-opt public servants and businessmen and move in the direction Iran wants
to. (BERMAN; HUMIRE, 2014; HUMIRE, 2015).
16 ALBA – Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra America. (Bolivarian Alliance for the
People’s of Our America). It is an intergovernmental organization based on the integration of its
members under Bolivarian ideology. It was founded by Cuba and Venezuela in 2004, and there are
currently more than 10 Latin American countries as members. (ALBA, 2017). To learn more check:
https://albainfo.org/what-is-the-alba/
17 Some authors say that after Hassan Rouhani has become the president in 2013, Iran has made a
strategic move towards targeting not only ALBA countries, but also and specially the US friendly
ones, in order to weaken US influence in the region. (BERMAN, 2014; HUMIRE, 2015).
18 We should also notice that Iran’s trade with Latin America is still miniscule and does not even reach
most of its countries. Latin America represents only about 2% of Iran’s total trade with the world.
( JOHNSON, 2014). From Latin American perspective, the largest traders with Iran in the region are
Brazil and Argentina. However, their exports to Iran represent less than 1% of their exports globally.
(SULLIVAN; BEITEL, 2016).
19 Iran and Venezuela have signed a variety of agreements in agriculture, petrochemicals, oil
exploration, automobile production, housing, banking and others. ( JOHNSON, 2014;
SULLIVAN; BEITEL, 2016).

Revista Brasileira de Ciências Policiais
Brasília, v. 9, n. 1, p. 43-90, jan/jun 2018

49

Venezuela´s Toxic Relations with Iran and Hezbollah

JOHNSON, 2014; SULLIVAN; BEITEL, 2016). However, the year
2005 proved to be a turning point in the Iran/Venezuela relations
when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was inaugurated as the new Iranian
president. Ahmadinejad and Hugo Chávez soon became very close
and their relationship enabled Iran to strengthen its bilateral ties with
Venezuela and also to move more vigorously towards other Latin
American countries with the diplomatic assistance of Venezuela,
which played a key role in furthering Iran’s relations with other leftist
governments in the region, aiming to gradually reduce the US influence
in the continent20. (FARHI, 2009; FARAH, 2011; NORIEGA;
CÁRDENAS, 2011; BRANDON; GRAY, 2015; SULLIVAN;
BEITEL, 2016).
Iran’s very capable intelligence service has allegedly long
embedded into Venezuela’s security services and thus, ever since it
has been able to collect and manage information, as well as advise its
Venezuelan counterparts. ( JOHNSON, 2014; HUMIRE, 2015).
Ever since Hugo Chávez came to power in 1999, there has been some
evidence that the Bolivarian Republic has been impregnated with
Middle Eastern mafia, which has embedded in various levels of its
government institutions. A considerable number of individuals of
Lebanese and Syrian descent currently hold high-level posts in the
Venezuelan government. ( JOHNSON, 2014; HUMIRE, 2015;
BLASCO, 2015). Some authors claim that many of these individuals
have close connections to Iran and Hezbollah. ( JOHNSON, 2014;
HUMIRE, 2015; BLASCO, 2015).
Following the embedding of Iranian intelligence officers
into Venezuelan security apparatus, Iran and Venezuela were
able to move to the next step, which has brought concern to
neighboring countries: the Iran/Venezuela military relation.
Some unclassified US Department of Defense Reports for
the US congress have stated that Iran has already deployed its
elite forces, the “Qods forces” (Special forces unit of the Iran
Revolutionary Guards - IRGC), to Venezuela to assist and
20 It is important to say that regardless Iran’s objectives in Latin America, Iran’s core foreign policy
spotlight remains its immediate region, in which Iran perceives more threats to its survival. For
this reason, Iran’s efforts and its level of involvement in countries like Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and
Afghanistan are infinitely larger and more consistent in comparison to its involvement in Latin
America. (SULLIVAN; BEITEL, 2016).
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train its military. (NORIEGA; CÁRDENAS, 2011; FARAH,
2011; LOVELACE, 2012; BERMAN, 2014; BRANDON;
GRAY, 2015; SULLIVAN; BEITEL, 2016). Iran’s capability
in asymmetrical warfare (one of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards’
competences) has been taught to Venezuelan military since
the year 2006, when Chávez personally invited Iran’s IRGC
personnel to come, train and advise Venezuelan military.
Later, Chávez sought to publish and distribute the Iranian
asymmetric warfare doctrine throughout Venezuelan armed
forces 21. (BERMAN; HUMIRE, 2014). Additionally,
other important aspect of their military relationship is the
establishment of military industrial joint ventures between the
two countries. Through several military agreements, Iran has
created some major military projects with Venezuela, including
the development of drone technolog y and the production of
missile related items in the region of Maracay, which is home
for Venezuela’s military industry, known as CAVIM (Compañía
Anónima Venezolana de Industrias Militares). This state owned
Venezuelan weapons company owns many industrial plants in
the area and three of its Venezuela/Iran joint military projects 22
are said to be in direct violation of US and International
sanctions on Iran 23. (HUMIRE, 2015).
Meanwhile, the Iranians well know that Latin America has an
abundance of strategic minerals and metals that are very useful for
their military programs, especially thorium and uranium24. Iran has
been active in purchasing these minerals throughout Latin America’s
21 The massive introduction of asymmetric warfare doctrine in the Venezuelan Military was officially
done by Hugo Chávez in 2006. He believed that he had to prepare for an eventual overseas military
attack. He was inspired to change Venezuelan military doctrine after acknowledging the effectiveness
of the Iraqi insurgents and the Afghan Taliban. (BERMAN; HUMIRE, 2014).
22 Some say that even though the Qods forces presence in Venezuela and the establishment of military
industrial joint ventures are confirmed, it could not be proved that Iran’s military presence in
Venezuela has been increasing lately. General Fraser, former SOUTHCOM commander allegedly
said that the ties between the two countries are everything but a military alliance. (LOVELACE,
2012; SULLIVAN; BEITEL, 2016).
23 Although most of the US and UN sanctions were lifted in 2016, UN Security Council resolution
2231 still restricts Iran’s conventional arms programs for a further five years. (IRANWATCH, 2018;
KATZMAN, 2018). For more information see footnote number 8.
24 Thorium is used in electronics manufacturing and it is probably going to be a future substitute for
uranium as nuclear fuel in nuclear reactors. (HUMIRE, 2015).
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black market in the past several years. Many countries in the continent
have large uranium deposits barely explored. Latin American
investors have apparently not yet envisioned it as a profitable market.
(BERMAN, 2014; HUMIRE, 2015). Nevertheless, Iran has been
surveying and beginning to explore uranium deposits in Venezuela
through several front companies and mining concessions granted
by former president Chávez. Up to the year 2016 this actions were
in direct violation of United Nations resolutions 1696/2006 and
1737/200625. (HUMIRE, 2015; NORIEGA; CÁRDENAS, 2011;
SULLIVAN; BEITEL, 2016; BERMAN; NORIEGA, 2017). The
uranium exploration is located mainly in the area known as the
“Roraima basin” along the border with Guyana and Brazil, where
huge underground uranium deposits can be found. That is what
probably explains the large presence of Iranians in the area, as well
as the government’s area designation as a no-fly zone. The whole
uranium exploration by Iranians in that area is shrouded in secrecy.
(BERMAN, 2014; BERMAN; NORIEGA, 2017).
Last, but definitely not least, what probably make the Iran/
Venezuela relation still most controversial are the Iranian ties
with its surrogate Hezbollah26 and their impact in Venezuela. The
group receives a large funding from Iran every year. That funding
together with the income from criminal enterprises help the
group to subvert and recruit people, as well as to conduct criminal
activities and corrupt Venezuelan officials. (FLEISCHMAN,
2013; JOHNSON, 2014; BERMAN, 2014; BRANDON; GRAY,
2015). Some reports indicate that the group has established five
training camps for asymmetrical warfare in Venezuela with the
consent of the government, and the financial/military aid of Iran.
(FLEISCHMAN, 2013; BRANDON; GRAY, 2015). The Iranian
regime and its proxy Hezbollah have been particularly astute in the
use of asymmetrical warfare throughout their operational theaters
25 For many years United Nations resolutions forbade countries to collaborate with the Iranian nuclear
program. The UN Security Council adopted seven resolutions as part of international efforts to
address Iran’s nuclear program. (ACA, 2017). For further reading, check: https://www.armscontrol.
org/factsheets/Security-Council-Resolutions-on-Iran. Nevertheless, these sanctions were lifted in
the year 2016. For more information see footnote number 8.
26 Iran and Hezbollah have been active in criminal/terrorist activities in Latin America for at least three
decades. Both Iran and Hezbollah are reported to have been directly linked to two massive bombings
against Jewish targets in Argentina, in the early nineties. (NISMAN, 2006).
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and Venezuela is no exception. They have been successful in their
covert infiltration of operatives who have been spreading ideology,
expanding presence, recruiting and structuring criminal operations
with the aim of strengthening their leverage within the country
and the region. (BERMAN, 2014; HUMIRE, 2015; BRANDON;
GRAY, 2015).
Years ago Venezuela made Iran/Hezbollah covert access to
Latin America easier by using its state-run airline CONVIASA
whose weekly direct flights - Venezuela/Iran/Venezuela – were
operational from 2007 through 2010. These flights were closely
supervised and controlled and the seats were accessible only to
people approved by either Iranian or Venezuelan governments. The
flights would often take off nearly empty and throughout the years
the airline was just cumulating losses, what possibly indicates that
the flights were mostly used to transport covert operatives, illegal
items and strategic material27. (NORIEGA, 2011; BERMAN;
HUMIRE, 2014; BRANDON; GRAY, 2015; BLASCO, 2015).
Consequently, back then; through that obscure flight route; Iranian
and Hezbollah operatives could come freely to Venezuela, which
served as a gateway to the whole continent. However, now that the
enigmatic flight route has for unclear reasons become inoperable,
they had to find other means to enter the continent. In spite of that,
once an operative touches the ground in Latin America he is able to
cross the international borders easily undetected as border controls
are notoriously poorly managed and the extensive continent’s land
borders also make them very porous. (BERMAN; HUMIRE, 2014;
JOHNSON, 2014; BRANDON; GRAY, 2015).
This unprecedented access to nearly everywhere within the
continent, facilitated by Venezuela’s complicity, grants Iran countless
opportunities to conduct covert operations in the region and also to
connect to transnational criminal organizations that already operate
in the continent. Consequently, it presents a security risk for the whole
of Latin America.
27 A former Iran’s Revolutionary Guard member and CIA spy allegedly said that these flights were
instrumental for the Iranian and Hezbollah terror network. They enabled the safe travel of spies,
terrorists, weapons experts, senior Iranian Intelligence operatives, as well as members of Hezbollah
and Hamas. (BARNES, 2010).
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3. Venezuela´s Nebulous Relations with
Hezbollah
Whenever speaking about the relations between Hezbollah
and Venezuela, it is impossible to dissociate it from Iran, once it has
all truly begun when Chávez strengthened his country’s ties with
the Islamic Republic in its quest to build an “anti-imperialist” and
anti-American bloc of nations. Both countries have in common this
anti-American sentiment; moreover, Hezbollah as an Iran surrogate
shares many of Iran’s priorities and principles, not to mention the
group’s sizeable funding from it. Iran’s adversaries are Hezbollah’s
adversaries. Iran provides extensive material assistance to Hezbollah,
not only funding but also training and logistics. Hence, ever since
Iran has established its covert operations in Venezuela, Hezbollah has
come along. They have worked in a few criminal projects together
with corrupted Venezuelan government officials. (PICKELL, 2010;
NORIEGA, 2011; NORIEGA; CÁRDENAS, 2011; BERMAN;
HUMIRE, 2014). Some sources within the Venezuelan administration
say that there are two Islamist entities involved in terrorism related
activities entrenched in Venezuelan territory: the Hezbollah and
its sympathizers, and the Iranian Qods Force (Iran’s Revolutionary
Guards elite force). They collaborate with one another on a regular
basis. These sources claim that they have also been growing in terms
of strength, and their tentacles might reach far into Latin America28.
In spite of having its armed activities focused primarily in
the Middle East, Hezbollah has been involved in terrorist activities
all around the Globe. As mentioned before in this article, Hezbollah
has come to South America for material support, and it relies on
the continent mainly for financing and recruiting, activities that
constitute part of the terrorism cycle29. Also, as observed before,
Hezbollah has long ago embedded within South American society
through the vast Lebanese and Syrian local diaspora30. There is no lack
28 Interview with respondent A in June/ 2017. Name withheld for confidentiality reasons.
29 The terrorism activity cycle is considered to be all the interconnected activities that ultimately lead to
the terrorist attack, which include, but are not restricted to: proselytizing, radicalization, propaganda,
recruiting, funding, training, logistics, resource administration, surveillance, attacking, evasion,
escape and media exploitation. (LASMAR, 2015).
30 Like it was mentioned before in this article, the areas of Maicao/Colombia, Isla Margarita/Venezuela
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of evidence demonstrating some level of support for Hezbollah within
those communities31. There were quite a few police investigations in
the past 20 years (carried out by police forces of Colombia, Paraguay,
Brazil and Argentina) whose focus were primarily drug trafficking,
arms smuggling and money laundering that regularly came across
Hezbollah’s operatives and/or facilitators and their support network,
who happened to have been deeply involved in those crimes under
investigation. (ROBINSON, 2003; NISMAN, 2006; FARAH, 2011;
NORIEGA; CÁRDENAS, 2011; SULLIVAN; BEITEL, 2016;
LEVITT, 2016b).
The history of Hezbollah in Venezuela is better understood
if we begin with the name of Ghazi Atef Salameh Nassereddine.
He was born in Lebanon and became a Venezuelan citizen in 2001.
Nassereddine is a diplomat and also the head of the Caracas Shia
Islamic Center. As a diplomat he has served in the Venezuelan
diplomatic mission in Syria and later in Lebanon. Taking advantage
of his diplomatic status he was able to develop ties with Hezbollah’s
leadership first in Lebanon and then in Syria. (TREASURY, 2008;
CONSTANZA, 2012; FARAH, 2016a). He was accused by the US
Department of Treasury to be a Hezbollah financial support provider.
(TREASURY, 2008; TREASURY, 2016). He was also involved
in facilitating Hezbollah’s operatives’ travels to Caracas aimed at
establishing fund raising operations (He is accused of granting
authentic Venezuelan passports for Lebanese and Syrian citizens
irregularly). Besides, some experts say that he has personally helped
in funneling the raised funds directly into Hezbollah’s bank accounts
(TREASURY, 2008; CONSTANZA, 2012; FARAH, 2016a).
Together with two of his brothers, he later made viable a network
that raised and laundered money, proselytized, recruited, trained and
expanded Hezbollah’s influence in Venezuela and in other parts of
and TBA are notorious for their large Lebanese and Syrian communities. Not only these places, but in
Brazil alone there are estimates of a 10 million Lebanese population that comprises the migrants and
their second and third generations. (SENADO, 2010).
31 In Venezuela this is evidenced by the emergence of a group called: “Hezbollah Venezuela”, which is far
from being as strong as its Lebanese brother, but it shares its same ideological views. There are some
authors who say that Chávez “Bolivarian revolution” ideology, together with his resistance to neoliberalism and capitalism, his anti-American platform, and opposition to US allies are some principles
shared with Iran, Hezbollah and radical Islam. These authors basically claim that the concept of social
justice is central to both Iranian and Bolivarian ideology. (PICKELL, 2010; FARAH, 2011). I’m not
going to describe these ideological views because it is not the scope of this article.
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Latin America. His younger brother Oday Nassereddine has helped
him to establish training facilities in Margarita Island, while Abdalah
Nassereddine has run the fund raising activities and the moneylaundering scheme. Ghazi Nassereddine became probably the most
prominent Hezbollah supporter in Venezuela, primarily because of
his strategic diplomatic posting, and his friendship with the former
Venezuelan Vice-President who was then Minister of Interior and
Justice, Tareck El Aissami. (NORIEGA, 2011; FARAH, 2011).
Other key actor in the beginning of Venezuela/Hezbollah
relationship was Fawzi Kan’an. (CONSTANZA, 2012; FARAH,
2016a). Fawzi Kan’an is a Lebanese-Venezuelan businessman who
received training in Iran together with other Hezbollah’s operatives.
Kan’an owned travel agencies in Venezuela. In the beginning of
Hezbollah’s operations in the country, he has helped the group to
move money to the Middle East. He has also aided Hezbollah in
facilitating the travel of its operatives to Venezuela. (TREASURY,
2008; CONSTANZA, 2012; FARAH, 2016a).
Venezuelan former vice president, Tareck el Aissami32 , was
the Minister of Interior from 2007 through 2012. In that position
he was the head of the Venezuelan passport agency (ONIDEX –
Venezuelan Identification and Immigration Directorate). When he
was in that position, he was responsible for allegedly issuing 10.000
Venezuelan passports to Islamist extremists from Syria, Lebanon,
Iran and other Middle Eastern countries, including members of the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard and Hezbollah. (HUMIRE, 2015;
OTTOLENGHI; HANNAH, 2017; AEI, 2017). Tareck el Aissami
is said to have been Iran’s man in Mérida and has helped Hezbollah to
channel funds to the Middle East. He has also enabled the coming of
Hezbollah operatives to Latin America, through Venezuela33. During
32 Tareck el Aissami is a Venezuelan of Syrian origin. Aissami’s father (Zaidan El Amin El AissamiCarlos Al Aissami) was the president of Venezuela’s Ba’ath Party and an ardent supporter of Islamic
jihad. He had solid ties with the leaders of “Iraqi Resistance”. Just before the US intervention in Iraq,
Aissami’s father praised Osama Bin Laden in a press conference. He used to say that he considered
himself to be a ‘Taliban’. (FERRAND, 2009; PICKEL, 2010; BARDUCCI, 2011a; RODIL, 2017).
33 A few authors claim that Tareck el Aissami has been a fierce critic of Israel and he is known for defending
passionately the Palestinian cause. Some say his speeches are incredibly similar to those of the radical
Islamists such as Hassan Nasrallah. Quite a few of his public speeches are carried in Venezuelan official
media, even the more passionate ones defending ardently the Palestinian cause and berating Israel. The
use of official media for these purposes might reveal that the Venezuelan government tacitly endorses
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his tenure as the Minister of Interior he has systematically facilitated
the immigration procedures for Islamist34 radical militants from Iran,
Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan into Venezuela. Intelligence reports
later admitted having information that a hundred and seventy three
individuals received this benefit and they were most likely affiliated with
Lebanese Hezbollah. (HUMIRE, 2015).
Being the vice president he was able to use the immense statepower within his reach to conduct all kinds of criminal and terrorist
activities in partnership with other Venezuelan government officials.
Under the auspices of the government, Venezuelan officials have been
using formal diplomatic, politic and economic channels to corrupt
people, to negotiate with criminal organizations, to manage their
criminal enterprises and to move illicit Iranian funds and Hezbollah
operatives throughout the region. Whoever opposes or denounces
Venezuelan government criminal enterprises is subject to harsh
penalties or death. Violence abounds. (BRANDON; GRAY, 2015;
HUMIRE, 2015; AEI, 2017).

4. Consequences for the Country: violence,
crime, corruption and terrorism financing
The current situation in Venezuela is often inadvisedly
interpreted as a primarily political or economic crisis. In fact, what lies
underneath the ongoing crisis is a criminal enterprise conducted by
government leaders and officials that systematically loot the state and
impair its governance. (ELLIS, 2017). In turn, the crisis in Venezuela
and its possible future breakdown also create an even more fertile
environment for the further advance of transnational organized crime,
violence, corruption and terrorism. On top of that, some corrupted
Venezuelan leaders have apparently embraced terrorism by supporting
Hezbollah’s operations inside the country. (NORIEGA, 2013;
FARAH, 20116b).
these passionate speeches. (FERRAND, 2009; PICKEL, 2010; MARTIN, 2017). Hugo Chávez
throughout his tenures as Venezuela’s president also gave innumerous speeches praising Hezbollah and
the Palestinian cause and condemning Israel and its actions in the Middle East. (PERDUE, 2014).
34 For the purpose of this article, Islamist is someone that uses Islam politically, as a political ideology
that seeks to derive legitimacy from Islam. (But not a form of Muslim faith or an expression of Muslim
piety). (CAGAPTAY, 2010).
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Venezuela is submerged in crime and corruption. The
Venezuelan government has been infiltrated by transnational
organized crime for more than a decade. (FARAH, 2016a; AEI,
2017; ELLIS, 2017). Several members of its government have been
directly or indirectly involved in drug trafficking, money laundering,
terrorism financing, international corruption and support for guerrilla
movements. In a lot of cases, the government officials engaged in these
crimes are the very ones responsible for repressing or policing these
criminal activities. Venezuela is already informally labeled a narcostate by some authors. However this denomination focus only in
one facet of a larger criminal enterprise. (NAGEL, 2015; FARAH,
2016a; AEI, 2017; ELLIS, 2017). For this reason, many authors argue
that the country has become a full criminal state. The connections
between Venezuela and Hezbollah-Iran possibly enhance the fragility
of the Venezuelan state enabling criminal enterprises to thrive, and
consequently it creates instability not only in Venezuela but also in its
bordering regions of Brazil and Colombia.
Venezuela has moved perilously closed to being a “criminalized state”, that is, a state where the senior leadership is aware
of, involved and act on behalf of the state with transnational
organized crime, where transnational organized crime is used
as an instrument of statecraft, and where levers of state power
are incorporated into the operational structure of one ore more
transnational organized crime groups. The Maduro administration is the central component of a multi-state ongoing criminal enterprise carried out in concert with Iran. (FARAH,
2015, p 02).

Even before the “Bolivarian Revolution35”, as Hugo Chávez
defined his movement, democracy was far from perfect in the country.
Venezuela had gone through turbulent years late in the eighties and
through the nineties. Its electoral system was rigid, exclusive and
corrupt. (FARAH, 2015; AEI, 2017). When Chávez was inaugurated
president in 1999, instead of coming up with the necessary reforms,
Chávez devised a plan that completely corrupted the already battered
35 “Bolivarian Revolution” is a term coined by Hugo Chávez. This “revolution” which is a leftist political
process was initially led by him. The name comes after Simón Bolívar, a 19th century Venezuelan
revolutionary leader. He conducted the independence campaigns of most northern South American
countries from Spanish rule. The “Bolivarian Revolution” is ultimately aimed to build an interAmerican alliance to achieve Bolivarianism, nationalism and state-led economy. (GANDY, 2006;
DURAND, 2011; ECURED, 2017).
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electoral system, institutionalized rampant corruption, criminalized
non-violent dissent and partnered with transnational terrorist and
criminal organizations36. (FARAH, 2015; AEI, 2017). Once in power,
Chávez centralized the government under the presidency and heavily
politicized the judiciary and the military. Moreover, he did not care
to amend the immoral legacy left by his predecessors: dismantled
transparency, poor accountability and the already damaged separation of
powers. Hence, he expanded his authority and control through military
force and simultaneously advanced the systematic looting of the state.
(NORIEGA, 2011; FARAH, 2015; AEI, 2017; ELLIS, 2017).
A case in point is Venezuela’s state-run oil giant, PDVSA
(Petróleos de Venezuela S.A.) that was turned by crooked officials
into an efficient instrument for corruption. Its opaque balance sheets
have covered more than 11 billion US dollars that went missing from
2004 through 2014, according to the Comptroller’s Commission of
the opposition-controlled National Assembly in 2016. (ULMER,
2016). Through PDVSA, Chávez and some officials within his
administration were able to create a useful network for money
laundering, illicit enrichment, political corruption, and a host of
other criminal activities. The company is perhaps one of the best
existing mechanisms to the country’s crooked officials to make viable
Venezuela’s international criminal network37. (ENRIQUEZ, 2015;
FARAH, 2016a; ELLIS, 2017).
As a consequence, Venezuelan government cronies consolidated the
spread of corruption and criminality throughout the administration. Hugo
Chávez’s death in 2013 did not inhibit corruption within the government;
on the contrary, the corrupt system has remained strong under the current
president Nicolás Maduro38. (NAGEL, 2015; AEI, 2017).
36 Hugo Chávez was very sympathetic towards the now extinct FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
de Colombia) and other Colombian guerrilla movements; as well as Iran and Hezbollah, as mentioned
before. Consequently, the US government has imposed several sanctions on Venezuelan individuals
and companies for supporting FARC, Iran and Hezbollah. (ROBINSON, 2003; FARAH, 2016a;
SULLIVAN; BEITEL, 2016).
37 Venezuela’s international criminal network was initially made possible through the devious
partnerships/agreements of PDVSA with the ALBA countries, and also with Iran. (ENRIQUEZ,
2015; FARAH, 2016; AEI, 2017). I’ll not go into the details of these partnerships because it is not
the scope of this article.
38 Venezuela sadly ranks 169 out of 180 on the Transparency International “Corruption Perceptions
Index”. (TRANSPARENCY, 2017).
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In January 2017, president Nicolás Maduro has announced
former minister Tareck el Aissami the country’s vice president39.
(LOPEZ, 2017). El Aissami is a familiar name in the world of
counterterrorism/counternarcotics intelligence. Some authors assert
that he plays an important part in the Venezuelan-state drug trafficking
network, and has also strong ties with Iran, Syria and Hezbollah.
(OTTOLENGHI; HANNAH, 2017; AEI, 2017; RABASA et al.
2017; ELLIS, 2017).
Venezuela is a natural passageway and a common route for the
Colombian-cocaine criminal enterprises to export their product to
Europe and the USA. This route has been intensely used since 2005
when Chávez has decided to increase his support to former FARC
and other Colombian guerrillas40. (IISS, 2011; FARAH, 2016b;
CAMERO, 2017; RABASA et al. 2017). As for Tareck el Aissami,
besides his ties with terrorists, according to the US Treasury Office
of Foreign Assets Control – OFAC, he has for a long time also been
involved in the cocaine business in both Venezuela and overseas.
OFAC affirms that he was closely linked to the drug trafficker Walid
Makled, a Syrian born, Venezuelan citizen who was one of the world’s
top drug kingpins. (OFAC, 2017). Makled allegedly used to ship 10
tons of cocaine per month to the USA. He was arrested in Colombia
and while in prison he has allegedly said that he used to routinely pay
bribes to several high-ranking civilian and military officials within the
Venezuelan government. He also supposedly said that Hezbollah not
only operated in Venezuelan soil, but the group also took part in the
cocaine business export. Makled also confessed to have paid large bribes
to Tareck El Aissami to ease his drug shipments through Venezuela.
(BARDUCCI, 2011b; US ATTORNEY, 2010; NEUMANN, 2011;
INSIGHT CRIME; 2016; RODIL, 2017). According to the US
Treasury Department, El Aissami also coordinates shipments from
his country towards Mexico and beyond; he protects drug traffickers
within Venezuela, and he also owns drug parcels that are regularly
shipped out of Venezuela, among other criminal acts. (OFAC, 2017).
39 Tareck el Aissami was Vice President until June/2018. Now he is the Minister of Industry and
National Production.
40 The close relations between Hugo Chávez and former FARC have been described in depth in the book
edited by the IISS named: ‘The FARC files: Venezuela, Ecuador and the secret archive of ‘Raul Reyes’
(IISS, 2011). I will not descend into details about this matter because it is not the scope of this essay.
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In February 2017, the US Treasury Department designated Tareck El
Aissami as a narcotics trafficker. (OFAC, 2017).
Over the years El Aissami was able to build up a sophisticated
operation in which he created a pipeline for criminal/terrorist
activities in Venezuela. This operation was grounded on a network of
businesses and front companies that have been successful in bringing
militant Islamists into Venezuela and neighboring countries, as well
as in funneling illicit funds and drugs to the USA, Europe and the
Middle East. (HUMIRE, 2015; OTTOLENGHI; HANNAH,
2017; AEI, 2017; ELLIS, 2017; OFAC, 2017). His multi-layered
financial network encompasses nearly 40 front companies that own
two dozen properties and tons of cash and other assets sitting in more
than 30 bank accounts scattered throughout Venezuela, Panamá, St.
Lucia, Curacao, USA and Lebanon. (HUMIRE, 2015; OFAC, 2017).
One more high-ranking Venezuelan official involved in
international drug trafficking is Diosdado Cabello. He used to be the
former president of the National Assembly and a former state governor.
Up to 2015 he was the country’s second most powerful man41. He
was a long time Chávez confidant. Diosdado Cabello’s involvement
in international drug trafficking emerged in 2012, when a Venezuelan
supreme justice magistrate named Eladio Aponte defected the regime,
fled the country and later testified Cabello’s link to Makled drug
trafficking organization42. (NAGEL, 2015; AEI, 2017).
Another threatening component of Venezuela’s criminal
operations is its support for terrorism. Some authors claim that
there is convincing evidence that some Venezuelan officials not only
support terrorism by laundering terrorists’ dirty money, but also some
government employees act in direct assistance to terrorists by providing
them material support to get to Latin America and move around the
continent. (NORIEGA, 2013; FARAH, 2015; FARAH, 2016b;
INSIGHT CRIME, 2016; AEI, 2017). In that matter, aside from being
a drug trafficker and money launderer, El Aissami is considered also to
41 He was the president of the National Assembly until 2015, when the majority passed to the
opposition; consequently, he fell from his position. (AEI, 2017).
42 There’s an extensive list of Venezuelan high-ranking officials involved in drug trafficking and an array
of other crimes, but for the purpose of this article and its page limit I will neither unveil their names,
nor describe their criminal networks and modus operandi.
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be the architect and one of the main pillars in a scheme to aid Hezbollah
and other terrorist organizations to expand operational networks within
Latin America. (OFAC, 2017). Some experts and practitioners say
that in recent times, Hezbollah has been participating regularly in the
lucrative drug smuggling operations handled in Venezuela and destined
to the European and US markets with the direct aid and provision from
the regime’s drug trafficker officials43. (BRAUN, 2012; NORIEGA,
2013; FARAH, 2016b; TAYLOR, 2016; AEI, 2017).
The convergence of corruption, crime, violence and terrorism
in Venezuela was enabled by a set of conditions and circumstances that
basically surfaced after Chávez was inaugurated as president in 1999.
From that time onwards, Venezuela became a crucial source of political,
financial and logistical support for Hezbollah in South America. Not
only does Hezbollah operate cells that conduct traditional funding
and political activities undisturbed by Venezuelan government,
but also the group is becoming ever more involved in international
drug trafficking. Finally, Hezbollah’s operatives and facilitators have
developed a solid ability to deliver financial and logistical support
for various organized crime groups across the region44. (NORIEGA,
2013; FARAH, 2015; TAYLOR, 2016; RABASA et al. 2017).

5. Consequences for Brazil: the threats posed
As I have mentioned before in this article, the Lebanese, the
Syrian and the Iranians have been migrating to South America for
quite some time. In the beginning, they have settled mostly in the
TBA, Maicao/Colombia and in Isla Margarita/Venezuela. Slowly
they were able to spread out all around the continent. Alongside their
migration movements, Hezbollah progressively came along.
43 Michael Braun, former DEA (Drug Enforcement Administration) chief of operations gives detailed
information on how Hezbollah’s cocaine smuggling enterprises work within South America in his
testimony before the US congress titled “Iran, Hezbollah and the threat to the Homeland”. (BRAUN,
2012). Available at: https://homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony-Braun.pdf
44 The reason behind this derives basically from five elements: first, the existence of clan and family based
networks of Lebanese run criminal businesses that are proficient in money laundering; second, access
to politically influential individuals and groups that share ideological or economic interests; third,
support from Iran (especially financial aid through Iranian sponsored institutions); fourth, epidemic
corruption in all levels in Venezuelan government and also to some extent in the neighboring region;
fifth, permeable regional borders with a constant historic flow of illicit trade. (AEI, 2017)
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Hezbollah’s presence in the continent is a well known fact.
In Brazil it is not different. The Lebanese Shia communities are
concentrated in Foz do Iguaçu/Brazil, Curitiba/Brazil and São Paulo/
Brazil, and there are also Shia communities all around the country.
There is enough evidence towards the strong connections between
Hezbollah and some Lebanese Shia in places like the TBA and the
Brazilian cities of Curitiba and São Paulo45. (NISMAN, 2006;
HUDSON, 2010; CONSTANZA, 2012; LASMAR, 2015).
The active or coerced support of the Lebanese Shia diaspora
in the Americas, Europe, Africa and the Middle East has helped
Hezbollah build a network of facilitators that allowed it to expand
its criminal activities on a global scale. Once Hezbollah and the Qods
Force operatives realized they could move freely in Venezuela, they
were able to slowly get across the continents’ porous borders looking for
partners in their illegal businesses. (BRAUN, 2012; CONSTANZA,
2012; REALUYO, 2014; LEVITT, 2016b; RABASA et al. 2017).
Brazil, Guyana and Venezuela are the largest producers and
exporters of alluvial diamonds in South America46. In order to be
able to trade diamonds, the countries have to comply and abide to
the regulations created and enforced by KPCS47 (Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme) which is responsible for promoting the
trade of legally mined diamonds all over the World. The diamonds
traded legally are issued a certificate, by KPCS. (PAC, 2006b; PAC,
2006c). Venezuela has operated outside the Kimberley System
certification since 200648. From that time on, it has not issued one
single Kimberley certificate. Its current diamond production is
unknown although, according to several sources, it is estimated to

45 It is important to note that, when I mention the connections of Hezbollah and the Lebanese Shia
diaspora, I do not mean they are all Hezbollah collaborators or facilitators. On the contrary, only a
very small percentage of them actually take part in Hezbollah’s criminal or terror activities.
46 One of the sites with the greatest occurrence of alluvial diamond mining in the continent lies in the
border intersection areas between Brazil, Guyana and Venezuela, where large diamond deposits are
located and mining activity is concentrated. (PAC, 2005; PAC, 2006b).
47 The KPCS (Kimberley Process Certification Scheme) was created in the year 2000, with support
from the UN, and it is responsible for promoting/regulating/controlling/enforcing the trade of legal
diamonds Worldwide. (PAC, 2006c).
48 Venezuela has unilaterally abandoned the Kimberley System certification in 2006. (PAC, 2006c).
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be in excess of 300,000 carats49. As a result of Venezuela abandoning
the Kimberley certification in 2006 and repeatedly ignoring the
organization's appeals to inspect their mining and trade, the country
was banned from certification in 2013 and has since been added to
the list of nations that cannot trade diamonds. (PAC, 2006c). As
a consequence, the criminal organizations that already exploited
this market both in Brazil, Venezuela, as well as in Guyana have
structured their businesses in order to be able to export Venezuelan
illegal diamonds50. (PAC, 2005; PAC, 2006a; PAC, 2006b).
Therefore, at the bordering areas of Venezuela and Brazil, there is
an intense flow of blood diamonds51. (PAC, 2006b; PAC, 2006c).
Since Hezbollah has already got a vast knowledge of the diamond
business52 (FARAH, 2004), some sources have suggested that part
of the production of Venezuelan diamonds has already entered
Hezbollah’s financing network, and, similar to weapons and drugs,
would be periodically sent to the Middle East to be sold in Lebanon
or the United Arab Emirates. Their base of operations in this illicit
trade is said to be the town of Boa Vista/RR/Brazil, which has a
strong tradition in diamond trade. These sources claim that the
coming of Hezbollah into this business in the Brazilian side of the
border has allegedly been facilitated by its networks in both TBA
and Venezuela. As a consequence, part of the illegal diamond trade
in Venezuela may possibly being used for terrorist funding and Brazil
may have become a place from where Hezbollah can also trade in
blood diamonds53.
49 As of 2006, it became difficult to estimate the country’s production, as it was entirely illegal. What
is known is that the diamond mining activity in Venezuelan territory, near the borders of Brazil and
Guyana continued to grow. (PAC, 2006c).
50 The smuggling of diamonds in the area bordering Brazil/Venezuela and Guyana is a complex
operation. I will not go into details because it is not the scope of this article.
51 The KPCS came up with the moniker 'blood diamonds’ aiming to tackle their trade because they
were mined in African countries undergoing conflict. Over the years the concept of 'blood diamonds'
expanded and now encompasses all diamonds mined and traded illegally and therefore criminally.
(PAC, 2005; PAC, 2006c).
52 Terrorist organizations have been using ‘conflict diamonds’ to finance their activities for a long
time. For decades, groups such as Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah have benefitted from the illegal trade
in diamonds originating from Western Africa. Nonetheless, Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah developed
expertise and ingenuity when assembling their smuggling structure which, initially, was greatly
facilitated because many of these diamond-producing African countries have little or no control over
their territory and have governments that are highly susceptible to corruption. (FARAH, 2004).
53 Interview with respondents A and B, in June/ 2017. Names withheld for confidentiality reasons.
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Besides, Brazil is home to millions of people of Lebanese
descent. As I have mentioned before, the more reliable figure estimates
the Lebanese population to be around 10 million. (SENADO, 2010).
Hezbollah has been able to create a network of support among a few of
them, especially, but not only, among the Shia Muslims, whose number
in Brazil is currently unknown54. In order to get community support,
Hezbollah’s basic modus operandi is: first of all, it seeks to inspire
loyalty within the Shia communities by managing their religious needs
and educational structures; secondly, Hezbollah works on its funding
asking for donations, and uses the communities’ business connections
to its own profit and to facilitate its later interaction with the organized
crime. (HUDSON, 2010; CONSTANZA, 2012; TAYLOR, 2016;
OTTOLENGHI, 2017).
Let me take for example the familiar tri-border area in South
America, also known as ‘TBA’, as I have mentioned before, where
Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay meet. This area was once dubbed
the “United Nations of Crime”, a counterfeiting hot spot. Hezbollah
found in TBA a largely under regulated free trade zone suitable for
exploitation. As I have previously pointed out, this area has hosted
a large Muslim community for decades. Hezbollah’s operatives were
aware of that fact, and it did not take long before they began to
plant agents and recruit sympathizers among the Arab and Muslim
migrants. (NISMAN, 2006; HUDSON, 2010; CONSTANZA,
2012; LASMAR, 2015; LEVITT, 2016b). That recruitment resulted
in the establishment of Hezbollah cells as well as nebulous networks
of individuals of Lebanese descent, mostly Shia that eventually
provided some sort of support for Hezbollah, either financial or
logistical. (NISMAN, 2006; LEVITT, 2016b). Along the eighties
the TBA saw the Muslim community growing fast. Meantime its
need for educational, cultural and religious institutions also grew.
At that point, a prominent leader of the local Muslim community,
Mohammad Youssef Abdallah, built one of these institutions,
the mosque ‘Profeta Maomé’. He was one of the first Hezbollah
54 There is no reliable figure of actual Hezbollah’s supporters and facilitators in Brazil. There are the
ones who support Hezbollah’s ‘resistance’ cause, both overtly and covertly; apart from that, there are
the ones that are involved as facilitators in Hezbollah’s criminal activities. It is difficult to make an
assessment of the number of Hezbollah’s criminal enterprises’ facilitators, since they operate covertly
throughout the region. (Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina, Bolivia, Venezuela and Colombia, mainly).
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members to move to TBA, according to the Argentine Intelligence.
A few years later, the Argentinian Federal Police found evidence of
the first Hezbollah network in the area. (NISMAN, 2006). A little
after the year 2000, some experts would estimate the numbers of
Hezbollah members living in the TBA to be a few hundred, plus
a much larger number of supporters and sympathizers. (LEVITT,
2016b). Assad Ahmad Barakat, who used to be Hezbollah’s secretary
general Hassan Nasrallah’s personal agent in the region, directed
a Hezbollah network in the TBA. He was said to be a criminal
supporter of Hezbollah and also closely tied to the group. (NISMAN,
2006). Police dubbed his criminal ring as the ‘Barakat Network’. The
ring’s headquarters was a popular shopping mall in Ciudad Del Este
called ‘Galeria Pagé’. His crimes included counterfeiting, extortion,
and money laundering, among others55. (NISMAN, 2006). He used
front companies together with diverse and complex ways to remit
money to Lebanon. Both Barakat56 and the above-mentioned Youssef
Abdallah were considered by the Argentinian Police and the US
Treasury to be key terrorist financiers in South America. (NISMAN,
2006; TREASURY, 2006). Eventually, the Brazilian Federal Police
arrested Barakat in the year 2002, on tax evasion charges. Afterwards,
he was extradited to Paraguay as requested by Paraguayan Attorney
General57. He then served six years of jail time. (STF, 2002). Barakat
came to Brazil after he left prison in Paraguay in the year 2008. Recently,
at the end of August 2018, Paraguayan authorities issued a warrant for
Barakat’s arrest. He is accused of identity theft in Paraguay (He was being
55 Barakat’s main criminal activities apparently were counterfeiting and extortion. He had a solid
experience in distributing and selling counterfeit US dollars. Also, some experts say he was well
known for shaking down local shopkeepers in order to raise money for Hezbollah. His tactics for
fundraising through donations were usually harsh. He used to threaten local shopkeepers by saying
that their families in Lebanon would be put in a ‘Hezbollah black list’ in case they did not pay their
share in donation through him. (TREASURY, 2004; LEVITT, 2016).
56 According to Paraguayan investigators, Barakat was allegedly more than a financier; he had direct and
frequent contact with Hassan Nasrallah. He used to make trips to Lebanon and Iran; moreover, he
was very close to Iranian diplomats in the region. The investigator allegedly further said that Barakat
was “the most feared and undisputed Hezbollah leader in the region.” (PERELMAN, 2003).
57 Ahmad Barakat was extradited on the charges of 'tax evasion’, in spite of the fact that the Paraguayan
prosecutors had requested his extradition based not only in tax evasion, but also on other crimes,
which were terrorism and Hezbollah financing related. Brazilian Supreme Court nonetheless did not
recognize the terrorism crimes, first of all because Brazil does not categorize Hezbollah as a terrorist
organization. Also, terrorism was not a typified crime in Brazil at that time. His extradition process
registered under the number: ‘Ext 853/STF’ include a collection of documents that explain the
circumstances under which the arrest warrant was issued against Ahmad Barakat. (STF, 2002).
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investigated for his illicit acquisition of a Paraguayan passport last April).
(OTTOLENGHI, 2018). Soon afterwards, Interpol issued a red notice
against him. In the meantime Brazilian Federal Police located him in
Brazil and began following him closely while waiting Brazilian Supreme
Court’s authorization for his arrest, which came very soon on September
19th, 2018. Two days later Brazilian Federal Police arrested Assad Ahmad
Barakat in Foz do Iguaçu/Brazil. (PF, 2018)58.

Another case in point has surfaced after the collection of
initial information by the police in the wake of the AMIA bombing of
199459. Soon after the bombing, Argentinian intelligence directed its
focus to Mohammad Youssef Abdallah and Farouk Abdul Omairi60,
among others. These two names stood out since they were believed
to be some of the main activists who provided direct support for the
bombing. (NISMAN, 2006; LEVITT, 2016b). According to the case
investigators, Youssef Abdallah was one of the first Hezbollah members
in the TBA, but not only that, the investigators said he was also a key
Hezbollah member in the TBA and he oversaw the group’s clandestine
operations in the region. (NISMAN, 2006). The investigators were
keen in following the evidence that eventually led them to connect
Abdul Omairi to the Iranian diplomat Moshen Rabbani. (NISMAN,
2006). The body of the evidence was initially a series of traced
telephone calls between the diplomat and the travel agency owned by
both Abdul Omairi and Youssef Abdallah in the TBA called ‘Piloto
Turismo’. They later found that ‘Piloto Turismo’ was not just a business
that provided cover for an array of criminal activities, but also a front
company opened with the help of Hezbollah’s money to serve its
58 It is worth noticing that soon after his arrest warrant was issued in Paraguay, Assad Barakat has
applied for refuge in Brazil under the allegation that he was being ideologically persecuted in
Paraguay. Nevertheless, knowing his spurious intentions, Brazilian Federal Police together with
Brazilian Attorney General’s Office have requested his immediate arrest, for his refuge application
was only a deceptive measure undertaken to obstruct Brazilian justice and thus to avoid extradition.
(MPF, 2018). Moreover, nearly 20 years ago, by the time Barakat was taken into custody in Brazil
in 2002 also for extradition (to serve prison time in Paraguay), he has tried to use the same artifice,
unsuccessfully. (MPF, 2018).
59 The ‘AMIA bombing’ was a terrorist attack on AMIA (Argentine Israelite Mutual Association).
It happened in Buenos Aires and 85 people were killed plus hundreds wounded. Argentinians
prosecutors accused Iran government of taking part directing the bombing and Hezbollah was
accused of executing it. (NISMAN; BURGOS, 2013). This is a complex case and I will not go deep
into its details because of the article’s page limit constraints.
60 The three of them: Youssef Abdallah, Ahmad Barakat, and Farouk Omairi were listed together in the
same document as terrorists by the US Treasury Department. (TREASURY, 2006).
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terrorist ambitions in the region. (NISMAN, 2006). Youssef Abdallah
has logged many travels to Lebanon. His role in Hezbollah included
personally taking the money raised in TBA directly to the group’s
leaders in Lebanon. Sometimes, as the US Treasury has disclosed,
the money has flowed in the opposite direction, when Hezbollah
would give Abdallah funds to support the group’s network in TBA.
(TREASURY, 2006). Years later, in 2006, Abdul Omairi and his two
sons were finally arrested by the Brazilian Federal Police61 on charges
of using the travel agency to falsify documents and launder drug
money. They were also charged with trafficking drugs between South
America, Europe and the Middle East62. (TRF4, 2007).
Moreover, there is a controversial topic that has been quite
frequent in the Brazilian media channels nowadays, which is the
debate of a possible association between Hezbollah and PCC63
(Primeiro Comando da Capital). According to some specialists, it
did not take long before Hezbollah started working together with
PCC. Their association allegedly started in 2006. (GURNEY, 2014;
LEALI, 2014; PALMER, 2016). These authors claim that around
the year 2006, Lebanese drug traffickers linked with Hezbollah’s
61 In the course of Federal Police’s Operation ‘Camelo’, Omairi and one of his sons (Kaled Omairi)
were arrested for providing travel support for drug mules transporting cocaine to Jordan. Omairi was
also indicted for having illegally obtained his Brazilian citizenship. He and both of his sons (Kaled
Omairi and Ahmad Omairi) were considered guilty of the charges on laundering drug money and
were convicted with 11 years and 8 months jail time. However, his younger son, Ahmad Omairi
has managed to escape the police raid. He is still at large. The Brazilian criminal lawsuit number
2006.70.02.002541-9 in which they are prosecuted and convicted is very comprehensive and
provides details of every step of their criminal enterprise. Nevertheless, it should be noted that neither
were guilty/convicted of association with Hezbollah on two reasons: first, as I have mentioned before,
Brazil does not consider Hezbollah a terrorist entity; second, at the time of the trial (2007) there was
no legislation in Brazil that criminalized terrorism, or terrorism financing. (TRF4, 2007).
62 Some Lebanese citizens connected to international criminal and drug trafficking organizations roam
free within South America’s drug trafficking and money laundering syndicates. Some of them have
close ties with the top tiers of regional drug trafficking groups. They frequently work together in
moving cocaine throughout the world. (STATE, 2011; BRAUN, 2012). South American Lebanese
ties to Hezbollah vary. Some traffickers belong to families linked with the group, while others just give
money to the group because they believe in its ideology, some others are already deeply involved in
the drug business and feel sympathetic to Hezbollah, and finally, there are the ones that do not care
for the cause or for Hezbollah, but they see Hezbollah as an interesting partner that bolster them in
increasing their profit capabilities in the drug trafficking business. (BRAUN, 2012; LEVITT, 2016b).
63 PCC – Primeiro Comando da Capital is the largest criminal enterprise in drug trafficking within
Brazil. It has 26.000 members and it is present in all the 27 Brazilian states. Its tentacles reach several
countries of South America, and through its facilitators PCC has been able to get as far as North
America, Africa, the Middle East and Europe. (RIBEIRO; CORREA, 2017).
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facilitators operating in TBA have assisted PCC to obtain weapons
through international arms smuggling channels. In retribution, PCC
would have apparently protected inmates of Lebanese origin detained
in the Brazilian prison system64. (GURNEY, 2014; LEALI, 2014;
PALMER, 2016; LEVITT, 2016b). Some experts further state that
the Lebanese weapons traffickers based in TBA have been selling arms
and explosives to PCC ever since. Part of the profits of these arms
trading would allegedly be remitted to Lebanon as means of financing
Hezbollah’s operations65. (UMAÑA, 2012; GURNEY, 2014;
LEVITT, 2016b). Nonetheless, there is still not enough evidence to
endorse a direct connection between Hezbollah and PCC; in spite of
the existence of a few good examples in the literature connecting PCC
with Lebanese criminals.
Nowadays, PCC is a strong drug trafficking organization in
Roraima. According to some sources, PCC has allegedly been making
its moves with Hezbollah’s facilitators to articulate cocaine shipments
through Brazilian and Venezuelan territory, in exchange for weapons.
There are some claims that Hezbollah’s facilitator’s networks (a
network that had allegedly been already well established in Boa Vista
with the blood diamond smuggling scheme) are now outsourcing
trusted sympathizers to enable the Venezuelan drug shipment
structure, together with ex-FARC guerrillas66. These sources say that
Venezuelan criminals and ex-FARC guerrillas play on the longstanding
relationship between Venezuela and former FARC that was developed
and strengthened by Hugo Chávez in the past.
Additionally, as the current political and economic situation
in Venezuela deteriorates, there has been a flow of refugees coming
over the border into Brazil. From the year 2014 up to September 2018
the Brazilian Federal Police in Roraima state had already processed
more than 65.000 Venezuelan refugees.67 (ACNUR, 2018). The
64 PCC is not only the largest drug trafficking organization in Brazil, but also the largest prison gang
within the country. (RIBEIRO; CORREA, 2017).
65 In 2006 some evidence of Hezbollah’s ties with criminal organizations in TBA was uncovered. The
US Treasury Department identified nine individuals, mainly drug traffickers and arms dealers, and
they were accused of providing financial and logistic support to Hezbollah. (US TREASURY, 2006).
66 Interview with respondents A and B, in June/ 2017. Names withheld for confidentiality reasons.
67 Venezuelan citizens have been so deprived of food and goods that in one weekend alone in June/2016,
around 150.000 people allegedly crossed the land border into Brazil (Roraima) to buy goods and
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undisturbed presence of Hezbollah operators and the Qods force
in Venezuela makes it a possibility, according to some interviewed
sources, that these operatives might have been infiltrated into Brazil,
under false names and counterfeit documents, disguised as refugees
with a formal legal status of immigrants68. Nevertheless, it seems a bit
early to acknowledge this alleged infiltration. This is still a hypothesis
since there is not enough evidence to suggest its actual occurrence.
Another case in point is the recent finding (February, 2017),
by Paraguayan police forces of 25 tons of Venezuelan currency
hidden in cloth bags in a weapons dealer’s home in the town of Salto
de Guairá/PY, which lies at the border with Brazil. Nearly all the
money came in 100 bolivar bank notes that have been worthless
thanks to the hyperinflation. The odd fact is that, according to some
experts, these bills are made of the same quality paper manufactured
by the supplier to the US Bureau of Engraving and Printing and are
consequently a preferred choice for counterfeiting US currency. If
made into 100 USD, these worthless bolivars bank notes would
become nearly 2 billion USD69. (INSIGHT CRIME, 2017;
OTTOLENGHI; HANNAH, 2017).
The initial investigation findings led to the fact that these 25
tons of currency would be destined to the TBA, to the hands of selected
counterfeiters70. Some authors claim that intelligence officers have
discovered that Hezbollah’s operatives within the TBA had been looking
for bolivars bank notes months before this seizure. (OTTOLENGHI;
HANNAH, 2017). This seizure has happened just days before
President Maduro would order the final withdrawal of the 100 bills
from circulation. The Paraguayan police has allegedly said this situation
indicates that the money was probably destined for counterfeiting as the
stock up on food. (ELLIS, 2017).
68 Interview with respondent A, in June/ 2017. Name withheld for confidentiality reasons.
69 USD – United States Dollars.
70 The Fund For Peace and Transnational Threats’ report about the TBA says that there is enough evidence
about the connection between terrorist groups and organized crime involving Venezuelans and TBA
criminal syndicates specialized in counterfeiting and identity fraud. (UMAÑA, 2012). Hezbollah’s
facilitators in TBA are well known for their expertise in counterfeiting. (CONSTANZA, 2012). The
close cooperation between Hezbollah’s TBA cells with their counterparts in Isla Margarita go back to the
nineties when they orchestrated the escape of their operatives after bombing their targets in Argentina in
1992 and 1994. (CONSTANZA, 2012). These facts lead us to think about a hypothetical connection
between Hezbollah’s counterfeiters and the destination of the seized bolivars.
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paper the money is printed is of high value for forgers, as mentioned
above, because it is supposedly a fine raw material for printing USD71.
(INSIGHT CRIME, 2017; OTTOLENGHI; HANNAH, 2017).
One of the hypotheses that have been ventilated by some
experts is that turning useless bolivars bills into strong USD is a
profitable scheme that would possibly be beneficial for Iran, Hezbollah
and Venezuela. (OTTOLENGHI; HANNAH, 2017). Taking into
consideration that Venezuela is nowadays on the brink of an economic
collapse and it is running out of foreign currency reserves, if these
tons of worthless currency were turned into USD by Hezbollah’s
counterfeit specialists, the terrorist group would receive a substantial
commission and would increase leverage with Venezuelan government
in reciprocity. Iran, on its turn, as a promoter of Venezuela-Hezbollah
relations, could possibly help injecting these counterfeit dollars into
the global economy. Hence, all of them would clearly profit from this
game plan. (OTTOLENGHI; HANNAH, 2017). However, that is a
hypothetical situation. Apparently, there is still no strong evidence to
confirm such theory.
Additionally, there is one crucial point, despite having approved
in 2016 an antiterrorism legislation72; Brazil does not consider Hezbollah
to be a terrorist organization73. Even though Brazilian political authorities
do not recognize Hezbollah as a terrorist group, the country’s security
forces do. The problem in this case is that, in my view, the security forces
lack a full government support to conduct their anti-terror investigations
in situations involving Hezbollah. This fact might be hindering a better
coordination among agencies towards addressing Hezbollah; thus,
possibly harming the effectiveness of the country’s security forces against
Hezbollah’s terrorist actions74 within Brazilian borders.
71 Apparently this is just the tip of the iceberg. According to local journalists and newspapers, in the
months following this specific seizure, several more tons of 100 bolivar bills were seized in seven
Brazilian states. Until now, the largest of all confiscations supposedly happened in March/2017
in a favela in Rio de Janeiro. Preliminary police investigations allegedly claim that all this money
confiscated was connected to TBA criminal organizations that used land routes through Brazil
and other South American countries to ensure the shipments of bolivars would arrive at the predesignated spots within the country. (GLOBO, 2017).
72 Law 13.260/16. Brazilian Antiterrorism Law.
73 According to the Decrees 8522/2015 and 8799/2016, Brazilian government only recognizes Taliban,
Al Qaeda and the Islamic State as terrorist organizations. (BRASIL, 2015; BRASIL, 2016).
74 As mentioned before, for the purposes of this paper, I consider ‘terrorist actions’ in a broad sense,
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Finally, in my opinion, there are still other possible threats
posed to Brazil that derive from the association of Venezuela,
Hezbollah and Iran; some of them are: tax evasion, money laundering,
capital flight, corruption, terrorism financing, radicalization and
recruitment. However, this article has no ambition to cover all the
threats, but rather to point what, in my view, are the more pressing
ones that currently impact our public and national security more
directly, and therefore require more immediate state responses.

6. Concluding Remarks
The crisis in Venezuela and its apparently ongoing collapse is a
fertile terrain for transnational organized crime, violence, corruption
and terrorism. The country’s economic agony and the disintegration
of its law enforcement have fueled unseen levels of lawlessness, civil
unrest and violence. For these reasons a growing wave of refugees are
flocking into Colombia and Brazil. These facts have a clear impact both
on the collapsing Venezuela and also on the neighboring countries,
and ultimately on the stability of the region.
Upon analyzing the current situation, Venezuela’s problems
will probably get worse before they get better. The country will
continue its downhill path in the near future, as a result of its
recent political and economical moves. Venezuela is on the brink of
becoming a failed state, besides the fact that some authors and experts
already consider it to be a narco-state. Its current administration
seems committed to aid Hezbollah and assist Iran’s interests in Latin
America. This is something that brings an additional concern and
apprehension for the region. If Venezuela becomes a de facto failed
state, we can expect terrorism and transnational organized crime to
soar, since both threats are already present in the country and have
been thriving under the auspices of its government. Other cases
around the Globe prove that once a state fails, it quickly becomes a
no man’s land, a safe-haven for terrorism and criminal organizations
with devastating consequences for its adjacent region, which always
bear the brunt of a neighbor’s collapse. For these reasons, Brazil
which include: proselytizing, radicalization, propaganda, recruiting, financing, training, logistics,
resource administration, surveillance, attacking, evasion and escape, among others.
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should neither ignore nor downplay Venezuela’s current and future
economic and political developments.
The bolivars seizure, the increasing strength of Venezuelan
crime/terrorism pipeline, the alleged alliance between Lebanese
criminals and PCC, Hezbollah’s facilitators operating all sorts of
crimes in TBA, the ever more sophisticated Hezbollah and Venezuelan
money laundering schemes, the country’s steadfast turn into a full
dictatorship: all these facts should be a warning sign of potential future
dreadful consequences of paying insufficient attention to the rolling
crisis in Venezuela. Its imperative that South American countries,
primarily the ones that border Venezuela, develop a coherent and
concerted strategy to address both the convergence of the mentioned
threats as well as the country’s political/economic crisis, before it is
too late. Venezuela’s neighboring countries should be prepared to get
involved with humanitarian aid and economic support. Besides, the
countries in the Western Hemisphere should continue to pressure
Maduro’s government. The United States’ unilateral sanctions could
backfire though, as they might feed even more into Maduro’s distorted
narrative of an ‘imperialist economic war’ against Venezuela.
Venezuela’s democracy has caved in. The majority of
Venezuelans see their current governors as illegitimate. The economic
collapse erodes their legitimacy. People protest on the streets.
Government repression is harsh. Recent developments in Venezuelan
political scenario have already indicated that if President Maduro
burns out entirely, former vice president El Aissami would be ready
to take over with an allegedly full support from Hezbollah. In some
Venezuelan political circles, notably within the current administration,
El Aissami is considered to be the ‘leader of choice’ for the regime’s
survival, since president Maduro’s rule faces strong public opposition
and it appears to be on the edge of downfall. If that scenario unfolds,
we could probably expect to be facing a threat that can possibly go
even beyond the ones outlined in this article, whose consequences
would most likely spur reactions still unknown.
An alarming possibility is that the level of violence could get
even higher and the country could enter a prolonged civil war. In this
case, an apparently ‘local problem’ could become a larger international
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issue of massive proportions like the ones we see in Syria, Zimbabwe,
Libya, Somalia, Afghanistan and other parts of the World today.
Concerning Hezbollah, differing perceptions between United
States and Latin American countries have ended up in dissimilar
approaches towards addressing Hezbollah’s activities in Latin America.
The United States considers Hezbollah a terrorist organization with
an unmistakable presence in nearly every continent. The United States
has the advantage of collecting information Worldwide and thus it
has the capability of analyzing Hezbollah’s network and structure
much more comprehensively. This far-reaching assessment allows the
United States to see the ‘bigger picture’, and therefore it can compare
and differentiate Hezbollah’s operations concerning fund raising and
other terrorist activities in a variety of ‘operational theaters’ around the
Globe. Consequently, the US broader view on Hezbollah influences
US attitudes towards addressing the group in Latin America.
On the other hand, no Latin American country formally
recognizes Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. Besides, there is
a widespread view among the continent’s political authorities that
there is no real terrorist threat in the region. These facts prevent Latin
American political establishment not only to view Hezbollah as a
terrorist threat, but it also inhibits the improvement of the countries’
security apparatus and institutions (law enforcement agencies and
military forces alike) to be structured and designed to face terrorism
threats. Therefore, since the security apparatus lack solid political
support nearly everywhere within Latin America, law enforcement
agencies and military forces might probably remain rather impaired
for the task of effective and comprehensive counterterrorism actions
that include fighting the various stages of the terrorism cycle, e.g.:
radicalization, proselytizing, recruiting, financing, logistics, resources
administration, training, criminal businesses, among others.
For the above-mentioned reasons, Hezbollah’s modus operandi
in Latin America has been difficult to detect and identify, hence,
to counter. Hezbollah has been tailored to function in places with
deficient security institutions and also where its operatives can cross
international borders freely and quickly. Without a large-scale and
comprehensive regional effort to uncover and counter its operational
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capabilities within Latin America, both Hezbollah and Iran’s covert
influence in the continent will continue to grow. That may prompt
the emergence of future safe havens for Hezbollah in countries other
than Venezuela.
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As Relações Tóxicas da Venezuela com o Irã
e o Hezbollah: um caminho de violência,
crime, corrupção e terrorismo
RESUMO
As relações da Venezuela com o Irã datam dos anos 1960, quando ambos foram membros fundadores da OPEP. A influência do Irã na América Latina se tornou maior após
a Revolução Iraniana. O Irã vê a América Latina como uma prioridade estratégica para
o seu posicionamento global. A imigração libanesa para a América do Sul começou há
tempos; porém, há um período, durante a guerra civil libanesa (1975-1990), em que um
número expressivo de imigrantes libaneses chegaram no continente americano. Àquela
época, de acordo com alguns experts, o Hezbollah e o Irã se aproveitaram desse movimento migratório massivo e infiltraram seus agentes e recrutadores entre os imigrantes muçulmanos. O Hezbollah é provavelmente o grupo terrorista mais organizado do
Mundo, no que tange à sua estrutura criminosa de financiamento. O grupo financia suas
operações terroristas por meio dos mais diversos crimes. O Hezbollah tem uma relação
estreita com o Irã. Desde que o Irã estabeleceu suas operações encobertas na Venezuela, o Hezbollah o seguiu como seu mandatário. A Venezuela está submersa em crime
e corrupção. O governo venezuelano foi infiltrado pelo crime organizado transnacional
há mais de uma década. A convergência entre corrupção, crime, violência e terrorismo se
tornou possível graças à uma série de circunstâncias que basicamente emergiram quando
Hugo Chávez foi empossado como presidente em 1999. Daquele momento em diante,
a Venezuela se tornou uma fonte de apoio político, financeiro e logístico para o Hezbollah na América Latina. Esse relacionamento entre eles traz impacto aos países vizinhos,
particularmente ao Brasil.
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Las relaciones tóxicas de Venezuela con
Irán y Hezbollah: un camino de violencia,
crimen, corrupción y terrorismo
RESUMEN
Las relaciones de Venezuela con Irán datan de los años sesenta cuando ambos eran
miembros fundadores de la OPEP. La influencia de Irán en América Latina se ha vuelto
bastante grande desde la revolución iraní. Irán ve a América Latina como una prioridad
estratégica para su posicionamiento global. La inmigración libanesa hacia Sudamérica ha
comenzado hace un tiempo. Pero hay un período, durante la guerra civil libanesa (19751990) cuando un gran número de inmigrantes libaneses llegaron al continente. En aquel
entonces, según algunos expertos, Hezbollah e Irán aprovecharon esta migración masiva
e infiltraron a sus agentes y reclutadores entre los migrantes musulmanes. Hezbollah es
probablemente la organización terrorista más organizada en el mundo con respecto a sus
actividades de financiación ilegal. El grupo financia sus operaciones regulares a través de
todo tipo de crímenes. Hezbollah tiene una relación estrecha con Irán. Desde que Irán estableció sus operaciones encubiertas en Venezuela, Hezbollah se ha presentado como su
representante. Venezuela está sumergida en el crimen y la corrupción. El gobierno venezolano ha sido infiltrado por el crimen organizado transnacional por más de una década.
La convergencia de la corrupción, el crimen, la violencia y el terrorismo en Venezuela fue
posible gracias a un conjunto de condiciones y circunstancias que básicamente se afianzaron luego de la inauguración de Chávez como presidente en 1999. A partir de ese
momento, Venezuela se convirtió en una fuente de apoyo político, financiero y logístico
para Hezbollah dentro de América Latina. Su relación afecta a los países vecinos, particularmente a Brasil.
Palabras clave: Venezuela. Hezbollah. Corrí. Violencia. Crimen. Corrupción.
Terrorismo. Crimen organizado. Convergencia. Brasil.
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